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Abstract
This paper characterizes optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a new key-
nesian model with sectorial heterogeneity in price stickiness. In particular, we
(i) derive a purely quadratic welfare-based loss function from an approximation
of the representative agent’s utility function and (ii) provide the optimal target
rule for fiscal and monetary policy. Differently from the homogeneous case, the
loss function includes sectorial inflation variances instead of aggregate inflation,
with weights proportional to the degree of price stickiness; and sectorial output
gaps instead of aggregate output gap with equal weight in each sector. Op-
timal policy implies a very strong positive correlation among sectorial output
gaps and some dispersion of sectorial inflation in response to shocks. Larger
heterogeneity in price stickiness implies larger impact of shocks on aggregate
inflation. Optimal taxes are more responsive in sectors with stickier prices.
∗We thank without implicating Andrea Ferrero, Marc Giannoni, Daniel Lima, Chris Sims. We
especially thank Ricardo Reis for many helpful suggestions.
1 Introduction
Recent research has established some empirical facts about price rigidity. First, prices
are sticky: Bils and Klenow (2004) show the average price duration is around seven
months in the US and Dhyne et al (2006) found an average duration of twelve months
in Europe. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in price stickiness across differ-
ent sectors.
The second fact has led researchers to incorporate heterogeneity in price sticki-
ness in the standard models to study its positive implications. Carvalho (2006) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) showed that heterogeneity in price stickiness leads
to larger and more persistent effects of monetary shocks. In this paper, our aim is to
study the normative implications of heterogeneity. We follow the strategy of Benigno
and Woodford (2003) to characterize optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a new
keynesian model with heterogeneity in price stickiness and show two main results.
First, we derive the representative consumers’ welfare-based quadratic loss func-
tion. Welfare depends on square deviations of all the sectorial inflations and sec-
torial output gaps. The weight on each sectorial inflation quadratic term is higher
the greater the price rigidity in that sector.1 Intuitively, sectors with higher price
rigidities generate higher distortions in response to exogenous shocks, so their stabi-
lization becomes more important for the policy maker. These different weights and
the convexity of the loss function imply that there is an optimal level of dispersion for
sectorial inflation in response to shocks. In contrast, the weights on sectorial output
gap are the same across sectors, implying that they should move in the same way in
response to shocks.
Second, we derive the optimal fiscal and monetary policy and show that there
are key differences from the standard homogeneous price stickiness case. If the gov-
ernment can levy sector-specific taxes on firms, a sectorial cost-push shock leads to
inflation, output and taxation movements not only in its sector, but in all the sectors
of the economy. In the sector hit by the shock taxes fall to offset inflationary pressures,
while in the other sectors taxes increase to keep the solvency of the government, gen-
erating inflationary pressures and preventing cross-sector output misalignment. The
increase in taxation is proportional to the degree of price stickiness in the sector,
1Aoki (2001) shows a similar result for a economy with a flexible price and a sticky price sector
and Benigno (2004) for a currency union.
2
because taxation responses are influenced by their impact on sectorial inflation and
output gap. When we consider a pure fiscal shock instead, the increase in aggregate
taxation splits among sectors the same way: the sectors with higher stickiness end
up being more taxed.
We also address the case where the government must levy the same tax rate in
all sectors. The optimal paths of inflation and the output remain qualitatively the
same as in the sector-specific taxation case. However, because there is no sectorial
instruments for the policy maker, there are more disperse optimal paths of sectorial
inflations and output gaps.
In the next section, we present the model. In Section 3, we recall the results in the
homogenous sticky price case. In Section 4, we show the implications of heterogeneity
in price stickiness for the loss function. In Section 5, we derive optimal fiscal and
monetary policy with sector-specific taxation. In Section 6, we derive optimal fiscal
and monetary policy when taxation is the same in all sectors. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Our model departs from the standard new keynesian setup (Woodford 2003) in two
ways. First, we allow for heterogeneity in price stickiness, since firms in different
productive sectors may have different probabilities of updating their nominal prices.
Second, we allow for sector-specific taxation.
There is a set Z of measure one of differentiated goods and respective suppliers
working under monopolistic competition. These suppliers can be aggregated into a
finite number of intervals or K productive sectors. Each good as well as each supplier
is indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ [1, 2, ...,K]. We denote as mk the measure obtained
from the aggregation of all suppliers working under sector k, which can be understood
as the relative weight of sector k, since
∑K
k=1mk = 1, where 0 < mk < 1. The next
subsections describe the new keynesian setup with heterogeneity in price stickiness.
Readers familiar with this literature can skip to Section 3.
2.1 Agents
A representative household chooses a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) composite of differentiated
consumption goods and supplies labor hours to a continuum of different types to
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monopolistically competitive firms (i.e., respectively, Ct and hk,t(z)):
Ut ≡ Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−t
[
u (Cj)−
K∑
k=1
∫
mk
v (hk,t(z)) dz
]
, (1)
where β is the discount factor and the utility is isoelastic;
u (Ct) ≡
C1−σt
1− σ
, (2)
K∑
k=1
∫
mk
v (hk,t(z)) dz ≡
K∑
k=1
∫
mk
λ
1 + ν
hk,t(z)
1+νdz, (3)
where σ, ν and λ are all greater than zero. The terms σ and ν are, respectively, the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, while λ is a normalizing constant.
The CES aggregate good Ct is a weighed sum of sector aggregates Ck,t:
Ct ≡
[
K∑
k=1
m
1/η
k C
(η−1)/η
k,t
]η/(η−1)
, (4)
where η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across sectors. The sector composite
consumption good Ck,t is:
Ck,t ≡
[
m−1/θk
∫
mk
ck,t (z)
(θ−1)/θ dz
]θ/(θ−1)
, (5)
where ck,t (z) is the quantity purchased of produced good z in sector k and θ the
elasticity of substitution among goods produced within each sector (independently of
which sector, i.e., θk = θ). There is no capital, investment or liquidity services pro-
vided by money. The aggregate price index of composite consumption good produced
in sector k is defined as:
Pk,t ≡
[
m−1k
∫
mk
pk,t (z)
1−θ dz
]1/(1−θ)
(6)
and the price-level is:
Pt ≡
[
K∑
k=1
mkP
1−η
k,t
]1/(1−η)
. (7)
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At the beginning of each period t, the representative household receives a nominal
tax-free gross interest rate Rt−1, over the stock of bonds acquired in the previous
period, Bt−1. The flow budget constraint is:
PtCt +Bt − Rt−1Bt−1 =
K∑
k=1
∫
mk
Wk,t(z)hk,t(z)dz +
∫ 1
0
Ψt(z)dz, (8)
where Ψt(z) are profits transferred from firm z.
Firms operate a constant-returns to scale technology and are subject to a sector-
specific technology factor ak,t, that is independent among sectors and E(ak,t) = 1,
V ar(ak,t) = σ
2
a, all k:
yk,t(z) = ak,thk,t(z), (9)
where yk,t(z) denotes the quantity produced by firm z in sector k.
As usual, αj−tk defines the probability that the price defined by firm z at period
t, pk,t (z), will remain valid until period t + j. Firm z chooses a price pk,t (z) that
maximizes the present discounted value of expected future profits:
max
{pk,t(z)}
Et
∞∑
j=t
αj−tk Θt,j [(1− τk,j) yk,j(z)pk,t(z)− hk,j(z)Wk,j(z)] . (10)
The term Θ is the stochastic discount factor and τk denotes the proportion of firm’s
revenues in sector k that is taxed by the government. Within the same sector, firms
are identical: they all have the same degree of market power, they face the same
productive shocks and employ the same amount of differentiated labor hours. Across
sectors, firms differ in terms of their productivity and are subject to different tax
rates over sales revenues and different degrees of price stickiness.
Government expenses are represented by an exogenous process Gt and it will
be taken as our fiscal shock. Aggregate government expenses follow the same CES
characterization of household consumption:
Gt ≡
[
K∑
k=1
m
1/η
k G
(η−1)/η
k,t
]η/(η−1)
, (11)
where Gk,t is the government consumption of sector composite good k. Government
consumption of sector composite good is defined in terms of differentiated goods
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produces by firms within that sector, analogous to (5), where gk,t(z) is government
consumption of good z:
Gk,t ≡
[
m
−1/θ
k
∫
mk
gk,t (z)
(θ−1)/θ dz
]θ/(θ−1)
. (12)
All government revenue come from distortive taxes on firms. The government’s
flow budget constraint is given in a date t perspective according to
Rt−1B
G
t−1 = B
G
t + St, (13)
where BGt denotes the end-of-period nominal liabilities of the government in terms of
the one period risk-free bond, St the government nominal primary surplus defined in
terms of sectorial aggregates according to:
St ≡
K∑
k=1
τ k,tPk,tYk,t − PtGt, (14)
where τ k is the tax rate applied over revenues of firms in sector k, Yk is the output
of sector k. Iterating forward allow us to write the government budget constraint as:
Wt = Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−tC−σ
−1
j sj , (15)
where st is the real value of (14) and Wt is defined as
Wt ≡
C−σ
−1
t
Πt
Rt−1bt−1 (16)
and bt the real value of debt at date t, or bt = Bt/Pt and Πt is the gross inflation rate
from date t− 1 to date t.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
The first-order conditions on consumer’s problem imply the following demand for
good z in terms of sector aggregate and for the sector aggregate in terms of aggregate
consumption and relative price:
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ck,t (z) = m
−1
k Ck,t
[
Pk,t
pk,t (z)
]θ
, (17)
Ck,t = mkCt
[
Pt
Pk,t
]η
. (18)
The consumer’s intertemporal problem define a unique stochastic discount factor and
the transversality condition:
Θt,j = β
j−tEt
[
C−σj
C−σt
Pt
Pj
]
, (19)
lim
j→∞
βjEt
[
C−σj
]
= 0. (20)
Sectorial real wages must satisfy:
µk,t
λhk,t(z)
ν
C−σ
−1
t
= wk,t(z), (21)
where µk,t ≥ 1 is an exogenous sector-specific markup factor in the labor market,
which is allowed to vary over time.2
Solving the optimization problem for the firm yields the following rule for price
setting in terms of sectorial and overall aggregate variables (similarly to Benigno and
Woodford (2003) and detailed in the Appendix A):
p∗k,t(z)
Pk,t
=
[
Kk,t
Fk,t
]1/(1+θν)
, (22)
Kk,t ≡
θλ
θ − 1
m−νk Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t µk,tΠ
θ(ν+1)
k,j
[
Yk,j
ak,j
]ν+1
, (23)
Fk,t ≡ Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t (1− τ k,j)C
−σ
j Π
θ−1
k,j pk,jYk,j , (24)
where pk,t stands for the relative price of sector k , or pk,t = Pk,t/Pt and Πk,j is the
2Benigno and Woodford (2003) introduce the same labor market disturbance in the aggregate
economy. An alternative approach is undertaken by Steinsson (2003), who motivate the cost-push
shock by considering the elasticity of substitution between goods stochastic. Both approaches reach
the same log-linearized system. Another alternative would be to introduce stochastic shocks in the
disutility of sectorial labor.
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gross inflation rate from period t to t+ j in sector k, or Πk,j = Pk,j/Pk,t. Kk,t is the
discounted sum of (constant) markups over present and future marginal costs and
Fk,t represent the discounted sum of present and future net revenues. In equilibrium,
all prices set within the same sector are equivalent. The relevant difference from the
homogeneous stickiness case is the definition of presence of sectorial aggregates and
the sectorial relative price level term. In addition, relative prices in sector k follow:
pk,t =
Πk,t
Πt
pk,t−1
Following the definition of overall and sector consumption, government’s demand
for differentiated goods or sector aggregates can be derived in a similar fashion as
household’s demands, leading to demands analogous to (17) and (18):
gk,t (z) = m
−1
k Gk,t
[
Pk,t
pk,t (z)
]θ
, (25)
Gk,t = mkGt
[
Pt
Pk,t
]η
. (26)
The market clearing conditions are: yk,t(z) = ck,t(z) + gk,t(z), all k and z; as well
as Bt = B
G
t .
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous variables XEnt =
{Πt, Πk,t, Yt, Yk,t, Fk,t, Kk,t, Wt, Pt, pk,t, Ct, Ck,t, bt}, policy variables X
P
t = {τk,t,
Rt} and initial conditions X
In
t0−1
= {Pt0−1, pk,t0−1, Rt0−1, bt0−1} for all k and t ≥
t0, that satisfy (17)-(26) and the market clearing conditions, given the exogenous
processes XExt = {Gt, ak,t, µk,t} , all k.
2.3 Ramsey Equilibrium
Using the market-clearing conditions, we can rewrite the consumer’s utility function
as:
Ut ≡ Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−t
[
(Yt −Gt)
1−σ
1− σ
−
λ
1 + ν
K∑
k=1
mk
[
Yk,t
mkak,t
]1+ν
∆k.j
]
, (27)
where ∆k,t is the sectorial price dispersion is (Appendix C for details):
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∆k.t ≡ m
−1
k
∫
mk
[
pk,t(z)
Pk,t
]
−θ(1+ν)
dz. (28)
With the model fully described, we can define the Ramsey equilibrium in this
economy:
Definition 2 In a Ramsey rational expectation equilibrium with commitment, the
social planner selects a competitive equilibrium by choosing policy instruments X Pt ,
all t, in order to maximize (27).
It is well known that, in the absence of further constraints, the solution to the Ram-
sey problem above implies time-inconsistency for the optimal plan.3 In the presence
of predetermined price dispersion, relative prices and debt level, the social planner
would try to benefit from the forward-looking nature of price-setting decisions and
attempt to reduce the real level of public debt by choosing a higher inflation rate
in the first period (t0) and then committing to a lower inflation level thereafter. As
the social planner would face the same incentives at every date, the solution would
imply deviating from commitment to a lower level of inflation in the first period and
committing to low inflation in the future.
One possibility for obtaining a time invariant solution follows Woodford (1999),
where the optimal solution with commitment is characterized from a timeless per-
spective. This approach imposes restrictions on the problem to prevent the social
planner from internalizing the gains from private expectations on the evolution of
inflation under commitment in the first period. In other words, consider a vector of
quantities Xt = {Fk,t, Kk,t, Wt}, all k and t. A restricted Ramsey equilibrium from a
timeless perspective imposes a set of preconditions on quantities so that optimization
takes place also subject to the fact that Xt0 must take certain values. In particular,
quantities Xt0 are chosen such as the first order conditions for the policy problem
applied over t0 are exactly the same as those applied in any date t.
Definition 3 In a restricted Ramsey rational expectation equilibrium with commit-
ment, the social planner uses policy instruments in order to select a competitive equi-
librium that maximizes (27) subject to the additional constraint of timeless perspective
Xt0 = {F¯k, K¯k, W¯}, all k.
3Stokey and Lucas (1983).
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Hereafter, we study the properties of the approximated solution for the restricted
Ramsey equilibrium in a multi-sector economy.
3 Revisiting the Homogeneous Price Stickiness Case
This section briefly describes the approximate solution to the Ramsey problem for
the case of homogeneous price stickiness. The derivation of the welfare-based loss
function and optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a homogeneous price stickiness
economy is fully characterized in Benigno and Woodford (2003). We begin by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 There is a deterministic steady state with zero inflation and positive level
of public debt and tax level.
We assume that the shocks that hit the economy are small enough that they do
not lead to paths of the endogenous variables distant from their steady state levels.
This is equivalent to assuming that shocks do not drive the economy too far from its
approximation point and, therefore, a linear quadratic approximation to the policy
problem leads to reasonably accurate solutions.
The loss function from consumer’s approximate utility function under homogenous
price stickiness is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The representative consumer’s utility function can be approximated
up to second-order by
Ut0 = −
Ω
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
λyy
2
t + λpipi
2
t
]
, (29)
where Ω ≡ C¯−σY¯ .
Welfare in the homogeneous price stickiness case depends only on square deviations
of inflation and output gap.4 This result rationalizes the usual loss function assumed
in the literature on monetary policy evaluations. One should notice the absence of
tax smoothing terms as in Barro (1979) or Bohn (1990). Policy restrictions are given
4The output gap here is defined as deviations from the target that results from the approximation
of the loss function around an inefficient steady state.
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by a new keynesian Phillips Curve and a government budget constraint, detailed in
the Appendix E.
Proposition 2 The optimal targeting rules that approximate the restricted Ramsey
Equilibrium with homogenous price stickiness by maximizing (29), subject to policy
restrictions are:
pit =
ωϕ
mϕ
∆yt −
nϕ
mϕ
pit−1, (30)
Etpit+1 = 0. (31)
Coefficient definitions are presented in the Appendix E. We refer to Benigno and
Woodford (2003) for complete characterization of parameter definitions and proofs.
The first implicit targeting rule has the form of flexible inflation targeting, similar to
the lump-sum taxation case, as in Woodford (2003). As in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002) the rate of change in output gap matters for adjustment of near term inflation
target. The second rule implies that in the optimal equilibrium the price level should
follow a random-walk.
4 Heterogenous Price Stickiness Case
In this section, we describe the log-linearized system that characterizes the heteroge-
nous price stickiness economy and derive its loss-function.
4.1 Approximate Model
The following lemma states that there is a deterministic steady state with the same
features as the one described in Section 3.
Lemma 2 There is a deterministic symmetric steady state, characterized by zero
inflation rate, uniform taxation and constant and positive level of public debt.
Proof. Appendix B.
As for the approximate model equations, first-order Taylor expansion over the
sectorial supply equation yields:
pik,t = κk{(σ˜ − η
−1)yt + (ν + η
−1)yk,t + δ(τˆ k,t − τˆ
∗
k,t)}+ βEtpik,t+1 + uk,t. (32)
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This sectorial Phillips Curve is similar to homogeneous price stickiness case, in the
sense that contemporaneous inflation depends on output and expected future infla-
tion. Differently, these are sectorial rather than aggregate relations. Moreover, there
is a term that relates sectorial inflation to aggregate output. If the elasticity of sub-
stitution among different sectors is high (η−1 close to zero), a higher aggregate output
leads to higher sectorial inflation. Tax over firms’ revenues has the effect of a typical
cost push shock: the higher the sectorial taxation that a firm faces, the higher the
price it would charge.
The tax rate target τ ∗k,t is a linear function of aggregate government expenses,
sectorial and aggregate productivity shocks, as well as average disturbances on the
labor market and other parameters of the economy (defined in Appendix F). We
interpret the term uk,t as a purely cost-push inefficient shock. It is a linear function
of assumed stochastic disturbances on labor market and other parameters of the
economy.
Sectorial Phillips Curves can be aggregated in order to yield a similar equation
for the aggregate Phillips Curve5:
pit =
K∑
k=1
mkκk{(σ˜−η
−1)yt+(ν+η
−1)yk,t+δ(τˆk,t− τˆ
∗
k,t)}+βEtpit+1+
K∑
k=1
mkuk,t. (33)
A first order log-linear approximation to the government budget constraint is given
by:
bˆ∗t−1 − b˜yyt − pit = (1− β)τ¯ s
−1
d
K∑
k=1
mk(τˆk,t − τˆ
∗
k,t) + βEt [ˆb
∗
t − σ˜yt+1 − pit+1]− ζt (34)
where s−1d and b˜y are constants defined in terms of parameters of the economy and
steady state level variables and ζt is a linear function of present and future (ex-
ogenous) government expenses, aggregate productivity and aggregate wage markup
shocks (Appendix F).
We introduce bˆ∗t as a variable that encompasses the stock of nominal debt and its
nominal return. In a word, bˆ∗t can be interpreted as the value at maturity of public
5Carvalho (2006) discusses its implications.
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debt, as in Ferrero (2005). The solvency of the government measured by the real
value of its obligations (i.e.: bˆ∗t−1 − pit) depends negatively on sectorial taxations and
aggregate output (tax base). We also impose when solving the model that neither
the present value of government assets explodes or implodes.
4.2 Welfare
In order to find the optimal policy we need an approximation of the representative
consumer’s welfare:
Lemma 3 A second-order approximation of the utility function is given by
Ut0 = ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{Yˆt +
(1− σ˜)
2
Yˆ 2t + σ˜YˆtGˆt + (35)
−
K∑
k=1
mk(1− Φ)[
θ
κk
pi2k,t
2
+ Yˆk,t +
(1 + ν)
2
Yˆ 2k,t − (1 + ν)Yˆk,taˆk,t]}
where
Ω ≡ C¯−σY¯ , (36)
κk ≡
(1− αk)(1− αkβ)
(1 + θν)αk
, (37)
and
Φ = 1−
θ − 1
θ
(1− τ¯ )
µ¯
< 1, (38)
Proof. Appendix C.
Φmeasures the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure and marginal product of labor in the many sectors of the economy.
Considering that aggregate output is given by the weighed sum of sector outputs,
then it is clear that the presence of the linear term is only due to this departure from
efficient level. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) eliminate this term by assuming a
distortive subsidy on firms’ production level (τ¯ < 0) financed by lump-sum taxes.
In order to express (35) purely in quadratic terms without the help of distortive
subsidies, we derive second-order approximations for the whole set of restrictions and
use the second order terms of such restrictions in order to express the discounted sum
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of the linear term for aggregate and sectorial outputs only in terms of quadratic en-
dogenous variables. The following proposition shows the main result of this section: a
second-order approximation to the policy problem in an environment of heterogeneity
of Calvo pricing:
Proposition 3 The representative consumer’s utility function can be approximated
up to second-order by
Ut0 = −
Ω
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
λyk
K∑
k=1
mky
2
k,t +
K∑
k=1
mkλk,pipi
2
k,t
]
, (39)
where the relative weights of sectorial inflations and sectorial output gaps depend on
structural parameters of the economy.
Proof. Appendix D.
This loss-function is different from the one derived without price heterogeneity in
two ways. First, square deviations of sectorial inflations appear in the loss function
in place of aggregate inflation. The greater is price stickiness in a particular sector,
the greater the relative importance of that sector’s inflation rate in the loss function.
This generalizes Aoki’s (2001) result for an economy with more than two sectors.
Differently from the homogenous case, the convexity of the loss function as well as
the different weights among sectors imply that, given a shock, there is an optimal
sectorial inflation dispersion.
Second, the usual negative effect of aggregate output gap volatility upon welfare
gives room to the sum of sectorial output gaps. Because the relative weight of each
sector is the same, reaction to shocks should be, in opposition to sectorial inflation
measures, the same in economies with symmetric sector sizes (same mks). Therefore,
the same cross-sector weight and the convexity of the loss function will imply strong
commovements of sectorial output gaps under optimal policy.
5 Optimal Policy with Sector-Specific Taxation
In this section, we find the approximate solution to the Ramsey problem described in
subsection 2.3. The problem is to find the paths for the endogenous variables {pit, pik,t,
yt, yk,t, bˆ
∗
t , τˆ k,t} in order to minimize (39) subject to the k sectorial Phillips curves
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given in (32), government budget constraint in (34), the definitions for aggregate
inflation in terms of its sectorial counterparts as well as aggregate output expressed
in terms of sectorial outputs.
5.1 Policy Problem Solution
From the FOCs, it is possible to show that the shadow value of government revenue
- given by the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint, or M b -
follows:
M bt = EtM
b
t+1 (40)
which implies, as in Barro (1979), that temporary disturbances to the level of exoge-
nous shocks produce permanent changes in the level of public debt.
The following proposition then characterizes optimal policy.
Proposition 4 The optimal targeting rules that approximate the restricted Ramsey
equilibrium with commitment under heterogenous price stickiness by maximizing (39)
subject to (34), (32) and the definitions for aggregate inflation and output are:
∆yk,t =
ϕ1
ψpik
pik,t −
ϕ2
ψpik
pik,t−1, (41)
Etpik,t+1 = 0, (42)
where the coefficients are defined in Appendix G.
These targeting rules differ from the case of a homogeneous price stickiness econ-
omy. The targeting rules presented in Section 3 now hold at the sector level, so the
expectation of future inflation has to be zero not only for aggregate inflation but for
each individual sector. In other words, sectorial price levels follow random walks. In
addition, the flexible inflation targeting rule holds at sectorial level.
5.2 Fiscal Shocks
The reaction to fiscal shocks makes these differences clear. We calibrated the para-
meters of the model to be close to the ones used in the literature and the median
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probability of adjusting prices is set to be 0.5 in all cases.6 Figure 1 compares the
optimal response of aggregate taxation, aggregate output gap, aggregate inflation
and public debt to a fiscal shock in three economies with different degrees of price
stickiness heterogeneity: the case with homogeneous probability of nominal adjust-
ment, the heterogeneous case with low variance on the degree of stickiness and the
heterogeneous case with high variance. The two panels on the left show that more
heterogeneity leads to a higher impact of fiscal shock on inflation, as well as a higher
instantaneous reaction of taxation. The intuition is that the policy maker does not
care about squared deviations of aggregate inflation, but rather about how sectorial
inflation rates commove. Hence, a higher level of inflation can be desirable provided
it leads to commovements of sectorial inflation closer to optimal.
Benigno and Woodford (2003) show that at this level of median stickiness in a
homogeneous economy the initial responses of taxation to a fiscal shock is negative.
Keeping the median stickiness of the economy at the same level and making price
stickiness more disperse, it is possible to obtain a positive initial response. Hetero-
geneity in price stickiness does not change the optimal response of aggregate output
gap, as seen in the first panel to the right; only the long term levels are slightly differ-
ent due to different levels of long-run aggregate taxation. The debt level is lower the
higher the variance of price stickiness, which is consistent with the taxation response
and solvency of public debt.
The same fiscal shock has different impacts on taxes and inflation in each sector.
Figure 2 presents the optimal paths of sectorial taxes, output gaps and inflations
in the economy with low variance in price stickiness. The optimal response implies
all sectorial output gaps must follow exactly the same path. This requires higher
inflation in the sector with lower stickiness. The initial impact on taxes is higher the
stickier is the sector. Intuitively, the optimal policy takes into account the inflationary
effects of higher taxation in sector with lower stickiness. Hence, taxation adjusts only
moderately, as expected in the light of our discussion of the loss function.
6We consider three cases: a homogeneous economy, where the degree of price-stickiness is set to
be .5 for each of the its three sectors; a heterogeneous case with low variance, where sectors presents
a probability of nominal adjustment in each period of .2, .5 and .8; and a high variance case, with
probabilities of .1, .5, and .9. All sectors have the same sizes. Risk aversion is set to 2, the inverse
of Frisch elasticity is set to .47, within-sector elasticity of substitution is 10; cross-sector elasticity
of substitution is 4.5; government consumption is set to 22% of GDP; with real surplus of 2%, and
annual debt level over GDP of 50%. Discount factor is .99, lambda is set to .98 and 1.05 is the
steady state level of gross wage markups. All shocks considered in this paper for IRFs are i.i.d..
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5.3 Cost-push shocks
Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions of the same sectorial variables to a
sectorial cost-push shock in the median sector. It leads to inflation, output gap and
taxation movements not only in that particular sector, but in all the sectors of the
economy. In the sector hit by a shock, taxation decreases substantially to offset
inflationary pressures.7 To keep the solvency of the government, other sectors must
have its taxation increased, generating inflationary pressures. Optimal responses also
prevent cross-sector output misalignment, as in the fiscal shock case. The increase in
taxation is proportional to the degree of price stickiness in the sector, because higher
taxes in a sticky sector would not impact inflation severely.
As in the fiscal shock case , optimal responses from aggregate inflation to a cost-
push shock in the median sector also increase when there is more heterogeneity.
The intuition here is the same as before: a higher aggregate inflation is desirable
if combined with sectorial inflation commovements closer to optimal. In Figure 4,
we point out that this fact, along with the optimal impulse responses from other
aggregate variables.
5.4 Welfare Analysis
In order to check the welfare relevance of the results above, we inspected the impact
of a policy maker that mistakenly disregards heterogeneity in price stickiness. Welfare
losses are computed using the same parameter values of the benchmark calibration
and the same distribution for price stickiness that characterizes the economies defined
previously in the text. Here the shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) processes whose
parameters we borrow from the empirical literature on sticky price DSGE models,
listed in Table 1.8 We refer to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) for the methodology
of welfare accounting.
Table 1 shows the difference in percentage points welfare losses when compared
with optimal policy welfare levels (when the policy-maker is aware of the hetero-
geneity). We assume that policy maker assigns the median level of stickiness in the
economy to all sectors. In this situation, taxation is uniform not because of any re-
7Omitted from first panel for scale reasons.
8As these authors do not consider sectorial estimates, we assume sectorial exogenous shocks follow
independent AR(1) processes with the same degree of inertia of the original estimation and with
standard deviation of 1/K-th of the original, while K is the total number of sectors.
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strictions in the number of policy instruments, but because policy maker is unable to
distinguish between sectors different degree of stickiness. As shown, the impact on
steady state consumption equivalent losses can be relevant: in the case of a low dis-
persion of sectorial price stickiness it leads to losses from .022% to .057%, depending
on the parameters used. In the case of high dispersion it leads to higher losses, rang-
ing form .201% to .489% depending on the calibration. Considering the average level
of household expenses for the US economy in 2006, these welfare losses imply that
each American household would consider making one annual payment from US$10 to
US$27 in the first case in order to guaranty a fully informed policy maker. In the
economy with large dispersion in price stickiness, this amount would be, respectively,
from US$99 to US$237.
6 Optimal Policy with Uniform Taxation
In this section we restrict the model in Section 4, making the government only able
to impose the same taxation over different sectors. We do that in order to distin-
guish which results come from the heterogenous stickiness and which come from the
heterogenous taxation assumption.
6.1 Response to shocks
Figure 5 shows the effects of a fiscal shock under homogenous taxation remain quali-
tatively the same for aggregate variables. Aggregate inflation and public debt change
their optimal paths when the degree of heterogeneity increases and aggregate taxation
is roughly the same across the different economies. Hence, the conclusion reported on
Section 5 regarding the aggregate endogenous variables reaction to cost-push shocks
remains also the same even when we restrict government’s taxation instruments.
In contrast, sectorial variables dynamics change with uniform taxation. In Figure
6, we show how a fiscal shock reflects among sectors with different price stickiness.
When the government is unable to impose sector-specific taxation, sectorial inflation
and output optimal paths are more spread when compared to heterogeneous taxation
case. In this restricted case, the policy maker cannot tax relatively more the stick-
ier sector where there is less inflationary pressures and higher output due to excess
demand. This leads to suboptimal sectorial responses to shocks when comparing to
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the previous situation: sectors with higher stickiness show lower and more persistent
inflationary effects and higher volatility on output gap.
The effects of a sectorial cost-push on aggregate variables leads to similar insights
to those in the fiscal shock case.9 However, uniform taxes change dramatically secto-
rial variables dynamics. As can be seen in Figure 7, the sector hit by the cost-push
shock (that is, the sector with median stickiness) shows the usual behavior: inflation
increases while output gap decreases. In order to offset these effects, optimal pol-
icy decreases taxation leading to a higher levels of public debt. Due to the lack of
sectorial instrument, this taxation decrease is applied in all sectors, thus leading to
deflation in the sectors not hit by the shock. Output gaps in these sectors increase
as a consequence not only of lower taxes but also due to the substitution effects from
the increases in prices in the sector hit by the shock. Notably, taxation under optimal
policy follows a staggering adjustment to a positive level in the subsequent dates.
6.2 Welfare Analysis
In Table 2, we again borrow from the empirical literature a more realistic structure
for the exogenous shocks and calculate the impact on welfare in terms of equivalent
consumption in steady state of restricting the policy maker in the number of policy
instruments. As Table 2 shows, when policy maker is restricted in the number of
sectorial instruments, welfare losses under our benchmark calibration are small. In
the case of a low dispersion in price stickiness, we observe higher losses of .001%
to .003% when compared with optimal policy; while in the case of high dispersion,
loss increases amount from .002% to .004% of steady state consumption. Although
allowing for sectorial instruments can be relevant, welfare losses from disregarding
heterogeneity are clearly more important.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to establish the normative implications of price stickiness
heterogeneity, by deriving its implications for optimal fiscal and monetary policy. The
welfare-based loss function derived here has key differences from the homogenous case.
First, welfare is affected by the sum of sectorial inflation square deviations, which im-
9We present the plot with the impulse response functions in the Technical Appendix of the paper.
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plies sectorial inflation dispersion in response to shocks. Second, welfare also depends
on the square deviation of each sectorial output gap with the same weight. This
suggests that sectorial output gap misalignments should be avoided under optimal
policy paths and that there is a role for sector-specific policy instruments.
We have shown that optimal targeting rules as well as responses of inflation, out-
put gap and public debt to shocks are different in the presence of different degrees of
price stickiness. In this sense, this paper provides a word of caution on optimal pol-
icy models that disregard this heterogeneity. Beyond the theoretical considerations,
realistic models for optimal fiscal and monetary policy should take into account not
only aggregate but sectorial data for calibration. We believe such a framework would
permit to quantitatively evaluate the implications of heterogeneity and sector specific
instruments of policy on welfare.
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8 Appendix A - The Firms’ Problem
Noting that θ > 1, FOC from firms’ optimization problem is given by:
Et
∞∑
j=t
αj−tk Θt,j
∂Ψj (pk,t (z) , .)
∂pk,t (z)
= 0.
Taking derivatives and isolating terms pk,t(z)/Pk,t, yields:
pk,t(z)
Pk,t
1+θν
=
θλ
θ−1
m−νk Et
∑
∞
j=t (αkβ)
j−t µwk,j
Pk,j
Pk,t
θ(ν+1) Yk,j
ak,j
ν+1
Et
∑
∞
j=t (αkβ)
j−t (1− τ k,j)C
−σ−1
j
Pk,j
Pk,t
θ−1
pk,jYk,j
(43)
9 Appendix B - Steady State
The government budget constraint in steady state is given by:
(1− β)b¯∗ =
K∑
k=1
τ¯ kY¯k − G¯. (44)
Assuming debt and government expenses are non-zero in steady state imply τ¯ k >
0, for some k. Also, given pk,−1 = 1 and zero inflation, all k. It is clear that ,
Y¯k = mkY¯ , which imply (44) becomes
(1− β)b¯∗ + G¯ = τ¯ Y¯ , (45)
where τ¯ =
∑K
k=1mkτ¯ k. From the firms maximization problem:
K¯k = F¯k.
Using definitions for both terms:
θλ
θ − 1
µ¯wk m
−ν
k Y¯
ν
k = (1− τ¯ k)
(
C¯
)
−σ
, (46)
which implies that sectorial tax rate is given by
τ¯k = 1−
θλ
θ − 1
µ¯wk
(
C¯
)σ
Y¯ ν, (47)
which only depends of aggregate variables and sector specific parameter µ¯wk . We
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assume that steady state wage markup is the same across sectors, that is µ¯wk = µ¯
w,
all k. In this case, steady state distortive tax rates are the same across sectors, that
is
τ¯k = τ¯ , ∀k (48)
Once one considers an always-possible normalization Y¯ = 1, the only restriction
made is that the level of consumption over GDP should not be too high in order to
tax rates to be positive. Equations
θλ
θ − 1
µ¯wY¯ ν = (1− τ¯ )
(
Y¯ − G¯
)
−σ
(49)
and (45) define the aggregate output level in steady state as well as the aggregate tax
rate, as in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
Define the set of commitments Xt = {Kk,t, Fk,t, Wt}, all k, and let X0 be the set
of initial commitments that make policy optimal form a timeless perspective. The
centralized policy maker chooses a sequence of Xt = {Πt, Πk,t, Yt, Yk,t, Fk,t, Kk,t, Wt,
∆k,t, τ k,t, b
∗
t , pk,t}, all k, for t ≥ t0 in order to maximize the representative consumer’s
utility subject to the constraints given in the main text and taking as given the initial
commitments X0 and the initial conditions I−1 = {b
∗
−1, ∆k,−1, pk,−1} for every k and
t ≥ t0. In order to impose constant commitments X0 = X¯ we consider additional
restrictions such as the first order conditions for the problem in t = t0 are equivalent to
the first order conditions for a generic t > 0. Consider the set of Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to equations in the main text. In order to complete the proof, we
need to show that first order conditions for the indicated steady state are satisfied for
time-invariant Lagrange multipliers. After taking FOCs from maximization problem,
it is possible to show that the system of steady state variables and time-invariant
multipliers is just-identified. Complete proof is given in the Technical Appendix.
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10 Appendix C - Second Order Approximation to
Utility Function
10.1 Second Order Approximation of Utility Function
We start with a second order Taylor expansion of the representative consumer’s wel-
fare function where ξt refers to the full vector of random disturbances, as in Benigno
and Woodford (2003). We start by working with u (Yt, ξt). Define hereafter, for any
variable Xt, X˜t ≡
Xt−X¯
X¯
, Xˆt ≡ log
Xt
X¯
It is know that the following relation holds up to second order:
X˜t  Xˆt +
1
2
Xˆ2t . (50)
Given the functional form assumed, we have:
u (Yt, ξt) = C¯
−σY¯ [Y˜t −
σ
2
Y¯
C¯
Y˜ 2t + σ
Y¯
C¯
Y˜tG˜t] + tips+O
3
p, (51)
where G˜t represents the absolute deviation over GDP. Defining sC =
C¯
Y¯
, yields
u (Yt, ξt) = C¯
−σY¯ [Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t (1− σs
−1
C ) + σs
−1
C YˆtGˆt] + tips+O
3
p. (52)
A second order Taylor expansion of v (Yk,t, ξt)∆k.t around steady state values yield
v (Yk,t, ξt)∆k.t = v
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
∆˜k.t + vYk
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
Y¯k(Yˆk,t +
1
2
Yˆ 2k,t) + (53)
+
1
2
vYkYk
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
Y¯ 2k (Yˆ
2
k,t) + vYk
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
Y¯k(Yˆk,t)∆˜k.t +
+vYkξ
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
Y¯k(Yˆk,taˆk,t) + vξ
(
Y¯k, ξ¯
)
∆˜k.t(aˆk,t) +
+tips+O3p.
Using the definition for ∆k,t one can show that ∆˜k,t is a term of second order. In
this sense, interactions between ∆˜k,t and aˆk,t or ∆˜k,t and Yˆk,t can be ignored up to
second order. Hence, expression (53) simplifies to
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v (Yk,t, ξt)∆k.t = λ
[
Y¯k,t
mk
]1+ν
{
∆ˆk.t
1 + ν
+Yˆk,t+
1 + ν
2
Yˆ 2k,t−(1+ν)Yˆk,taˆk,t}+tips+O
3
p, (54)
once one notice that ∆ˆ2k,t is of higher order than O
2
p. Using a second order Taylor
expansion over the law of motion for sectorial price dispersion given by
∆k.t = αkΠ
θ(1+ν)
k,t ∆k.t−1 + (1− αk)
(
1− αkΠ
θ−1
k,t
(1− αk)
) θ(1+ν)
θ−1
(55)
yields
∆ˆk.t = αk∆ˆk.t−1 +
1
2
αk
(1− αk)
θ(1 + ν)(1 + θν)pi2k,t +O
3
p, (56)
once we used the relation Πˆk,t = pik,t +
1
2
pi2k,t , where pik,t is the percent variation of
sectorial price level pik,t = logPk,t/Pk,t−1. Iterating backwards yields
∆ˆk.t = α
t−1
k ∆ˆk.−1 +
1
2
αk
(1− αk)
θ(1 + ν)(1 + θν)
t∑
j=0
αt−jk pi
2
k,j +O
3
p. (57)
Here we consider the sectorial price dispersion in the remote past as a "term indepen-
dent of policy". Further considering that it is possible to change positions of sums
over t and k on (54), and re-ordering the terms:
∞∑
t=0
βt∆ˆk.t =
1
2
αk
(1− αk)(1− αkβ)
θ(1 + ν)(1 + θν)
∞∑
t=0
βtpi2k,t + tips +O
3
p. (58)
Substituting (58) over (54) yields
v (Yk,t, ξt)∆k.t = λ
[
Y¯k,t
mk
]1+ν
{
1
2
αkθ(1 + θν)
(1− αk)(1− αkβ)
pi2k,t + Yˆk,t+
+
1 + ν
2
Yˆ 2k,t − (1 + ν)Yˆk,taˆk,t}+ tips+O
3
p.
This way, we can approximate the representative consumer utility up to second
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order by the following expression:
Ut0 = ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{Yˆt +
(1− σ˜)
2
Yˆ 2t + σ˜YˆtGˆt + (59)
−
K∑
k=1
mk(1− Φ)[
θ
κk
pi2k,t
2
+ Yˆk,t +
1 + ν
2
Yˆ 2k,t +
−(1 + ν)Yˆk,taˆk,t]}+ tips+O
3
p,
where
Ω ≡ C¯−σY¯ , (60)
κk ≡
(1− αk)(1− αkβ)
(1 + θν)αk
, (61)
σ˜ ≡ σs−1C (62)
and
(1− Φ) ≡
θ − 1
θ
(1− τ¯ )
µ¯w
. (63)
10.2 Second Order Approximation to AS Equation
The starting point is the expression for the sectorial non-linear Phillips Curve, given
by:
(
1− αkΠ
θ−1
k,t
(1− αk)
) 1+θν
θ−1
=
Fk,t
Kk,t
. (64)
We define Vk,t as
Vk,t =
1− αkΠ
θ−1
k,t
(1− αk)
. (65)
Using a second order Taylor expansion on Vˆk,t:
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Vˆk.t = −
αk(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
[
pik,t +
1
2
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
pi2k,t
]
+O3p. (66)
Considering the expression for Kk,t define Πk,t,s = Pk,s/Pk,t, where s ≥ t is some
date in the future and Pk,t the aggregate price level in sector k in period t. We use a
second order Taylor expansion:
K˜k,t = (1− βαk)Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t {kˆk,j +
1
2
kˆ2k,j}+O
3
p, (67)
where the term kˆk,t can be defined as kˆk,j = θ(1 + ν)pik,t,j + (1 + ν)Yˆk,j − (1 + ν)aˆk,j
Taking the expression in the text for Fk,t given by (24), we define the net revenue
factor as Γk,t ≡ 1− τk,t, and taking second-order Taylor expansion:
F˜k,t = (1− βαk)Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t {fˆk,j +
1
2
fˆ 2k,j}+ O
3
p. (68)
where we define fˆk,j = Γˆk,j − σCˆj + Yˆk,j + pˆk,j + (θ − 1)pik,t,j .
Using F˜k,t, K˜k,t, as well as Vˆk.t, Fˆk,t and Kˆk,t,after some algebra, we get:
[
1 + θν
θ − 1
]
Vˆk,t = (1− βαk)Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t {[zk,j − (1 + θν)pik,t,j] +
+
1
2
[zk,j − (1 + θν)pik,t,j ] [Xˆk,j + [(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]pik,t,j]}
−
1
2
[
1 + θν
θ − 1
]
Vˆk,t(1− βαk)Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t {Xˆk,j + [(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]pik,t,j}+O
3
p,
where
Xˆk,j ≡ Γˆk,j − σCˆj + (2 + ν)Yˆk,j + pˆk,j − (1 + ν)aˆk,j + µˆ
w
k,t, (69)
fˆk,j − kˆk,j = zk,j − (1 + θν)pik,t,j (70)
and
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zk,j = Γˆk,j − σCˆj − νYˆk,j + pˆk,j + (1 + ν)aˆk,j − µˆ
w
k,t. (71)
Define
Zk,t ≡ Et
∞∑
j=t
(αkβ)
j−t {
[
Xˆk,j + [(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]pik,t,j
]
} (72)
We can replace in the expression above and after some algebra we get:
(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1− βαk)
Vˆk,t(pik,t+1) = (pik,t+1)Et
∞∑
j=t+1
(αkβ)
j−t−1 {zk,j− (1+θν)(pik,t,j)}+O
3
p
(73)
We can use the definition for Vˆk,t and replace above, also ignoring the terms O
3
p
or of higher order:
− κ−1k
[
pik,t +
1
2
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
pi2k,t − αkβEtpik,t+1 −
1
2
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
αkβEtpi
2
k,t+1
]
=
zk,t +
1
2
zk,tXˆk,t − (1 + θν)
αkβ
(1− αkβ)
Etpik,t+1+
−
1
2
[(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]
β
κk
Etpi
2
k,t+1+
−
1
2
(1 + θν) (αkβ)Et[pik,t+1Zk,t+1]+
+
1
2
(1 + θν)αk
(1− αk)
[pik,tZk,t − αkβEt[pik,t+1Zk,t+1]] +O
3
p,
where we have defined κk elsewhere.
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Further simplification yields
− κ−1k pik,t −
1
2
κ−1k
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
pi2k,t −
1
2
(1 + θν)αk
(1− αk)
pik,tZk,t
= zk,t +
1
2
zk,tXˆk,t − κ
−1
k βEtpik,t+1
−
1
2
κ−1k {
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
+ θ(1 + ν)}βEtpi
2
k,t+1
−
1
2
(1 + θν)αk
(1− αk)
βEt[pik,t+1Zk,t+1] +O
3
p.
Multiplying both sides for −κk allow us to write above expression as
Vk,t = −κk{zk,t +
1
2
zk,tXˆk,t}+
θ(1 + ν)
2
pi2k,t + βEtVk,t+1 +O
3
p, (74)
where:
Vk,t = pik,t +
1
2
{
(θ − 1)
(1− αk)
+ θ(1 + ν)}pi2k,t +
1
2
κkαk
(1− αk)
[pik,tZk,t]. (75)
A second order Taylor expansion of log(1− τ k,t) yields
log(1− τ k,t) = log(1− τ¯ )−
τ¯
1− τ¯
τ˜ k,t −
1
2
τ¯ 2
(1− τ¯ )2
τ˜ 2k,t +O
3
p,
which can be recasted as
Γˆk,t = −δτˆk,t −
δ
(1− τ¯ )
1
2
τˆ 2k,t +O
3
p.
Log-approximation on consumption as a function of aggregate output and govern-
ment expenses yields:
Cˆt = s
−1
C Yˆt − s
−1
C Gˆt +
1
2
s−1C (1− s
−1
C )Yˆ
2
t −
1
2
s−1C (1 + s
−1
C )Gˆ
2
t + s
−2
C YˆtGˆt +O
3
p (76)
Using both results, one can be generally express (74) as
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Vk,t = Et0
∞∑
j=t
βj−t{−κk[zk,t +
1
2
zk,tXˆk,t] +
θ(1 + ν)
2
pi2k,t}+ tips+O
3
p. (77)
One could finally note that a first order approximation to (77) yields the known
Phillips Curve of the form:
pik,t = κk{(σ˜ − η
−1)Yˆt + (ν + η
−1)Yˆk,t + δτˆk,t (78)
−σ˜Gˆt − (1 + ν)aˆk,t + µˆ
w
k,t}+ βEtpik,t+1 +O
2
p.
10.3 Second Order Approximation to the Budget Constraint
We approximate the intertemporal government budget restriction by a second order
Taylor expansion. Taking the definitions of the intertemporal government budget
constraint and primary surplus and making a second-order approximation, we get:
W˜t = (1− β)Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−t{−σC˜t + s˜t +
1
2
σ(σ + 1)C˜2t − σC˜ts˜t}+O
3
p. (79)
It is also easy to show that Wˆt = bˆ
∗
t−1 − σCˆt − pit and W˜ = Wˆ +
1
2
Wˆ +O3p. Then,
we can re-write W˜t as:
W˜t = bˆ
∗
t−1 − σCˆt − pit +
1
2
(bˆ∗t−1 − σCˆt − pit)
2 +O3p. (80)
The approximation to the primary surplus is
sds˜t =
K∑
k=1
mkτ¯ [(τˆk + pˆk,t + Yˆk,t) +
1
2
(τˆk + pˆk,t + Yˆk,t)
2]− Gˆt −
1
2
Gˆ2t +O
3
p, (81)
where sd ≡
s¯
Y¯
and s¯ =
∑K
k=1 τ¯ Y¯k − G¯ = τ¯ Y¯ − G¯.
Hence, the second order approximation for the intertemporal budget constraint
can be obtained from the above expressions. One can notice that a first order ap-
proximation yields:
31
bˆ∗t−1 − σ˜(Yˆt − Gˆt)− pit =
(1− β)Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−t{s−1d
K∑
k=1
mkτ¯ [τˆ k + pˆk,t + Yˆk,t]+
+ (σ˜ − s−1d )Gˆt − σ˜Yˆt}+ tips+O
2
p
where pˆk,t is a function of sectorial and overall outputs.
10.4 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relation
Sectorial demand expressed is pηk,t = mkYt/Yk,t and log-linearized as
pˆk,t = η
−1(Yˆt − Yˆk,t), (82)
which establishes an exact (inverse) relation between sector relative price and sector
relative product. Also, using pk,t =
Πk,t
Πt
pk,t−1 and Π
1−η
t ≡
∑K
k=1mk (Πk,tpk,t−1)
1−η one
gets
Y
(η−1)/η
t =
K∑
k=1
m
1/η
k Y
(η−1)/η
k,t , (83)
which relates aggregate and sectorial outputs. Log linearization of (83) yields
Yˆt +
1
2
(1− η−1)Yˆ 2t =
K∑
k=1
mkYˆk,t +
1
2
(1− η−1)
K∑
k=1
mkYˆ
2
k,t +O
3
p. (84)
11 Appendix D - Elimination of Linear Terms
11.1 Matrix Notation
We invite the reader to check out the complete version is available in the Technical
Appendix. We start by defining
x′t =
[
Yˆt Yˆ1,t ... YˆK,t pi1,t ... piK,t τˆ1,t ... τˆK,t
]
, (85)
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ξ′t =
[
Gˆt aˆ1,t ... aˆK,t µˆ
w
1,t ... µˆ
w
K,t
]
. (86)
For notational convenience, we also define the following terms: υ ≡ 1 + ν, ωη ≡
1− η−1, χ ≡ ν + η−1, σ˜ ≡ σs−1C , ς ≡ σ˜ − η
−1, δ ≡ τ¯
1−τ¯
and −ωC ≡ 1− s
−1
C .
Using the definitions above, expression (59) can be written in matrix notation as
Ut0 = ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{A′xxt −
1
2
x′tAxxxt − x
′
tAξξt}+ tips+O
3
p (87)
where Ax, Axx, and Aξ are, respectively, (3K + 1) × 1, (3K + 1) × (3K + 1) and
(3K + 1)× (2K + 1) matrices.
The Sectorial Phillips Curve expressed in (77) can also be written in matrix no-
tation. We start by substituting expressions for pˆk,t into definitions for zk,t and Xˆk,t,
underlined in (71) and (69). Our aim is to separate quadratic and linear terms.
Quadratic and linear terms of random disturbances are placed into tips. After some
manipulation one obtains:
Vk,t0 = Et0
∞∑
j=t0
βj−t0{C ′x,kxt +
1
2
x′tCxx,kxt + x
′
tCξ,kξt}+ tips+O
3
p (88)
for a generic sector k. As in (87), matrices Cx,k, Cxx,k, and Cξ,k have, respectively,
dimension (3K + 1)× 1, (3K + 1)× (3K + 1) and (3K + 1)× (2K + 1).
The government budget constraint can also be simplified in matrix notation. Tak-
ing expression given in (79), we eliminate references for pˆk,t, and replace Cˆt and s˜t
for their expressions in terms of endogenous variables xt and exogenous processes ξt.
Grouping linear and quadratic terms, yields:
W˜t0 = (1− β)Et0
∞∑
j=t0
βj−t0{B′xxt +
1
2
x′tBxxxt + x
′
tBξξt}+ tips+O
3
p (89)
where, as in (87) and (88), matrices Bx, Bxx, and Bξ are, respectively, of dimensions
(3K + 1)× 1, (3K + 1)× (3K + 1) and (3K + 1)× (K + 1).
Finally, (84) can be expressed in matrix notation as
0 =
∞∑
j=t
βj−t{H ′xxt +
1
2
x′tHxxxt}+O
3
p (90)
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where we have used the fact that the definition for aggregate output in terms of its
sectorial counterparts expressed in (84) is valid at all dates. Matrices Hx and Hxx
have, respectively, dimension (3K + 1)× 1 and (3K + 1)× (3K + 1).
11.2 Elimination of Linear Terms
In order to eliminate linear terms in (87), we need to find a set a multipliers ϑ1C , ...,
ϑKC , ϑB, ϑH , such as
ϑ1CC
1′
x + ... + ϑ
K
CC
K′
x + ϑBB
′
x + ϑHH
′
x = A
′
x (91)
By solving the linear system of equations, one gets the following set of solution:
ϑB = −
Φ
Υ
, ϑH = 1 − Ξ
Φ
Υ
and, for every k, ϑkC =
mk(1−τ¯)
κk
Φ
Υ
, where we have used
the fact that τ¯ = τ¯k, all k, and defined: Υ ≡ (ς + χ)(1 − τ¯) + σ˜sd − τ¯ and Ξ ≡
ς(1− τ¯) + σ˜sd − τ¯ η
−1.
Hence, using relations (87), (88),(89), (90), and (91) one can write:
Et0
∞∑
j=t0
βj−t0A′xxt = Et0
∞∑
j=t0
βj−t0[
K∑
k=1
ϑkCC
k′
x + ϑBB
′
x + ϑHH
′
x]xt (92)
= −Et0
∞∑
j=t0
βj−t0{
1
2
x′tDxxxt + x
′
tDξξt}+
K∑
k=1
ϑkCVk,t0 +
ϑBW˜t0
(1− β)
,
where Dxx =
∑K
k=1 ϑ
k
CCxx,k + ϑBBxx + ϑHHxx and Dξ =
∑K
k=1 ϑ
k
CC
k
ξ + ϑBBξ.
We use this last relations in order to rewrite (87)
Ut0 = −ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{
1
2
x′tQxxxt + x
′
tQξξt}+ Tt0 + tips+O
3
p, (93)
where
Tt0 = Ω{
K∑
k=1
ϑkCVk,t0 +
ϑBW˜t0
(1− β)
}, (94)
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is a vector of predetermined variables. Definitions of Qxx and Qξ in terms of parame-
ters of the economy defined in the Technical Appendix. As in Benigno and Woodford
(2003) and Ferrero (2005), references to sector tax rates have been eliminated. Only
references to sectorial inflation measures, sectorial and aggregate outputs remain,
which imply (93) can be simplified further by getting rid-off tax rates references and
by separating terms referring to sectorial and overall outputs from references to sec-
torial inflation. Proceeding in such fashion yields
Ut0 = −
Ω
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{x′y,tQ˜yxy,t + 2x
′
y,tQ˜ξξt + x
′
pi,tQ˜pixpi,t}+ Tt0 + tips +O
3
p, (95)
where xy,t is a K + 1× 1 vector containing only references to aggregate and sectorial
outputs measures, and xpi,t is a K × 1 vector containing only sectorial inflation mea-
sures and Q˜y, Q˜ξ and Q˜pi are matrices of coefficients. From (95), we now focus on the
term:
x′y,tQ˜yxy,t = qyY
2
t +
K∑
k=1
mkqykY
2
k,t + 2
K∑
k=1
mkqy,ykYtYk,t, (96)
where q terms are combinations of the parameters of the economy defined in the
Technical Appendix. Under the assumption that wage markups is steady state as well
as markups over marginal costs are the same across sectors (µ¯wk = µ¯
w and θk = θ) , q
coefficients are all independent of k. We use the following lemmas in order to simplify
(96) further:
Lemma 4 The following expression relating sum of sectorial output variances and
covariances of sectorial outputs and aggregate output is of third order.
Yˆt
K∑
k=1
mkYˆk,t −
K∑
k=1
mkYˆ
2
k,t = O
3
p (97)
Proof. Technical Appendix.
Lemma 5 The following expression is, at least, of second order:
Yˆt −
K∑
k=1
mkYˆk,t = O
2
p. (98)
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Proof. Follows directly from (84).
Lemma 6 The following expression holds:
[Yˆt −
K∑
k=1
mkYk,t]Gˆt = O
3
p. (99)
Proof. From proposition above plus the fact that all exogenous processes are O1p.
Lemma 7 The following expression is of third order:
Yˆ 2t −
K∑
k=1
mkYˆ
2
k,t = O
3
p. (100)
Proof. Technical Appendix.
From (96), and using (97) and (100) one gets:
x′y,tQ˜yxy,t = λyk
K∑
k=1
mkY
2
k,t +O
3
p, (101)
where
λyk = qyk + 2qy,yk + qy. (102)
From (95), we focus on the term:
x′y,tQ˜ξξt = qyGYˆtGˆt + qykG
K∑
k=1
mkYk,tGˆt +
K∑
k=1
mkYˆk,t[qykak aˆk,t + qykµk µˆk,t]. (103)
where q- coefficients are defined in the Technical Appendix. Using (99) we get:
x′y,tQ˜ξξt =
K∑
k=1
mkYk,t[q
′
ykG
Gˆt + qykak aˆk,t + qykµk µˆk,t] +O
3
p, (104)
where
q′ykG = qyG + qykG.
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Replacing (104) and (101) over (95) yields the expression for the second order
approximation for the utility function:
Ut0 = −
Ω
2
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{λyk
K∑
k=1
mky
2
k,t +
K∑
k=1
mkλk,pipi
2
k,t}+ Tt0 + tips +O
3
p, (105)
where
yk,t = Yˆk,t − Yˆ
∗
k,t (106)
and
−Yˆ ∗k,t = λ
−1
yk
[(qyG + qykG)Gˆt + qykak aˆk,t + qykµk µˆk,t] (107)
all k, and, most importantly, λyk and λk,pi provide the weigh of each of these terms in
the welfare-based criteria. Besides the complete definition of such terms, the Technical
Appendix addresses the conditions for concavity.
12 Appendix E - Definitions of Homogeneous Case
The typical policy restrictions are given by a new keynesian Phillips Curve and a
government budget constraint, respectively:
pit = κ[(σ˜ + ν)yt + δ(τˆ t − τˆ
∗
t )] + βEtpit+1 + ut (108)
bˆ∗t−1 − σ˜yt − pit = (1− β)[(τˆ t − τˆ
∗
t ) + byyt] + βEt[bˆ
∗
t − σ˜yt+1 − pit+1] + ζt (109)
where bˆ∗t is defined as the debt at maturity at date t, or bˆ
∗
t = bˆt + Rˆt, where Rˆt
is the gross interest rate. Other variables are defined according to the notation of
our model given in Section 2: σ˜ ≡ σs−1C , s
−1
C ≡ Y¯ /C¯, by ≡ τ¯ Y¯ /(τ¯ Y¯ − G¯) − σ˜, and
δ ≡ τ¯ /(1 − τ¯). Hat-variables are defined as steady state levels. The shock terms
such as ζt and ut are linear functions of aggregate government expenses, productivity
and wage markup shocks. Finally, τˆ∗t is the tax rate target, also defined as a linear
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combination of exogenous shocks.10
Definitions of the coefficient of the optimal targeting rules are given, in terms
parameter in the model presented at Section 2, as
ωϕ = −λ
−1
pi [(1− β)s
−1
d (1− τ¯)κ
−1 + 1] (110)
nϕ = −λ
−1
y σ˜ (111)
mϕ = −λ
−1
y [(s
−1
d (1− τ¯) + by)(1− β) + σ˜] (112)
13 Appendix F - Log-linear Approximation of Re-
strictions
13.1 Definition of Target Variables
Explicitly using the assumption that sector specific tax rates as well as wage markups
in steady state are the same across sectors, we can define the target level of aggregate
output using (107):
−Yˆ ∗t = λ
−1
yk
[(qyG + qykG)Gˆt + qykak aˆt + qykµk µˆt] (113)
where q- coefficients are defined in terms of the structural parameters of the economy
and aˆt and µˆt are respectively defined as: aˆt =
∑K
k=1mkaˆk,t and µˆ
w
t =
∑K
k=1mkµˆ
w
k,t.
13.2 Aggregate supply and cost-push disturbance term
Adding and subtracting, respectively, the terms referring to overall and sectorial
output targets with the appropriate coefficients yield over first order approximation
of AS equation yields
pik,t = κk{(σ˜ − η
−1)yt + (ν + η
−1)yk,t + δ(τˆk,t − τˆ
∗
k,t)}+ βEtpik,t+1 + uk,t, (114)
10Details in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
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for every k, where the definition for the cost-push term uk,t is a function of sectorial
wage markup shocks:
uk,t = κk[1− (ν + η
−1)λ−1yk qykµk ]µˆ
w
k,t (115)
and
−δτˆ∗k,t = −[(σ˜ + ν)λ
−1
yk
(qyG + qykG) + σ˜]Gˆt − (σ˜ − η
−1)λ−1yk qykµk µˆ
w
t (116)
−(σ˜ − η−1)λ−1yk qykak aˆt − [(ν + η
−1)λ−1yk qykak + (1 + ν)]aˆk,t.
can be understood as the target level for distortive taxation in sector k and q- coef-
ficients are defined in terms of the structural parameters of the economy. Averaging
across sectors allows us to determine the generalized aggregate first order approxima-
tion for the AS equation in (33), similar to Carvalho (2006).
13.3 Budget Constraint and fiscal disturbance term
We start by taking a first order approximation to expression (79), yielding
bˆ∗t−1−σ˜(Yˆt−Gˆt)−pit = (1−β)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0{byYˆt+τ¯ s
−1
d
K∑
k=1
mk[τˆk+ωηYˆk,t]+bGGˆt}, (117)
where we have defined for convenience the terms s−1d , by and bG, respectively, as
s−1d ≡
Y¯
τ¯ Y¯−G¯
, by ≡ s
−1
d τ¯ η
−1 − σ˜, and bG ≡ σ˜ − s
−1
d . Expression (117) can be written
in recursive terms. Using the definition for aggregate output in terms of sectorial
outputs and the definitions for target variables given in (107) and (116), we get:
bˆ∗t−1− b˜yyt−pit+ ζt = (1−β)τ¯ s
−1
d
K∑
k=1
mk(τˆ k,t− τˆ
∗
k,t) +βEt [ˆb
∗
t − σ˜yt+1−pit+1], (118)
where b˜y ≡ σ˜ + (1− β)(by + τ¯ωηs
−1
d ) and
ζt = ω
G
1 Gˆt + ω
a
1aˆt + ω
µ
1 µˆ
w
t − ω
G
2 EtGˆt+1 − ω
a
2Etaˆt+1 − ω
µ
2Etµˆ
w
t+1, (119)
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where ωG1 , ω
G
2 , ω
a
1, ω
a
2, ω
µ
1 and ω
µ
2 are defined in terms of the structural parameters
of the economy.
13.4 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relation
First order approximation to (84) combined with the redefinition in terms of deviation
from aggregate and sectorial output targets, yields
yt =
K∑
k=1
mkyk,t. (120)
14 Appendix G - Optimal Solution with Commit-
ment
For simplicity, define: τˇ k,t ≡ τˆ k,t − τˆ
∗
k,t. Setting up the Lagrangian, one can establish
the following set of FOCs, where Mxt denotes the multiplier of equation referred
tovariable x and where the last line correspond to the preconditions that allow the
problem to be valid for all t ≥ 0. FOCs with respect to pit,k, pit, τˇk,t, yt, yk,t and b
∗
t
are, respectively, given by:
λpi,kpit,k +M
pi
k,t −M
pi
k,t−1 =M
pi
t , (121)
Mpit =M
b
t −M
b
t−1, (122)
Mpik,t = −M
b
t
(1− τ¯ )(1− β)
κk
s−1d , (123)
−
K∑
k=1
mkM
pi
k,tκk(σ˜ − η
−1)−M bt b˜y +M
b
t−1σ˜ +M
y
t = 0, (124)
λykyk,t −M
pi
k,t[κk(ν + η
−1)]−Myt = 0, (125)
M bt = EtM
b
t+1, (126)
plus the problem’s constraints. Substituting (122) and (123) into (121) yields the law
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of motion to sectorial inflation in terms of debt Lagrange Multiplier M bt :
pik,t = ψ
pi
k(M
b
t −M
b
t−1), (127)
where
ψpik ≡ λ
−1
pi,k
[
1 +
(1− β)(1− τ¯ )s−1d
κk
]
.
From (124),
Myt = Φ˜1M
b
t − Φ˜2M
b
t−1, (128)
where Φ˜1 = b˜y − (1− τ¯ )(1− β)s
−1
d (σ˜ − η
−1) and Φ˜2 = σ˜. Taking (125), replacing for
Mpik,t from (123) and isolating for yk,t yields
yk,t = ϕ1M
b
t − ϕ2M
b
t−1, (129)
where
ϕ1 ≡ λ
−1
yk
[Φ˜1 − (1− τ¯)(1− β)s
−1
d (ν + η
−1)],
ϕ2 ≡ λ
−1
yk
Φ˜2.
Summing up across sectors yields the aggregate output in terms of debt Lagrange
Multiplier:
yt = Σ1M
b
t − Σ2M
b
t−1, (130)
where we defined coefficients Σ1 and Σ2, respectively as Σ1 ≡ ϕ1 and Σ2 ≡ ϕ2.
Finally, it is relevant to notice that under commitment, optimal solution imply
that policy is conducted in such a way that:
Etpik,t+1 = 0, (131)
every k. In order to see this, we take leads in (127), apply expectation and use relation
(126). In its turn, (131) for every k imply the same behavior for aggregate inflation,
or:
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Etpit+1 = 0. (132)
Also, for very k, (127) and (129) imply
∆yk,t =
ϕ1
ψpik
pik,t −
ϕ2
ψpik
pik,t−1 (133)
and the aggregate relation
∆yt =
Σ1
ψpi
pit −
Σ2
ψpi
pit−1, (134)
where
ψpi ≡
K∑
k=1
mkψ
pi
k .
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Figure 1: Effects of a Fiscal Shock on Aggregate Variables.
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Figure 2: Effects of a Fiscal Shock on Sectorial Variables
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Figure 3: Effects of a Cost-Push Shock in Median Sector on Sectorial Variables.
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Figure 4: Effects of a Cost-Push Shock in the Median Sector on Aggregate Variables.
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Figure 5: Effects of a Fiscal Shock on Aggregate Variables: Homogeneous Taxation
Case.
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Figure 6: Effects of a Fiscal Shock on Sectorial Variables: Homogeneous Taxation
Case.
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Variables: Homogeneous Taxation Case.
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Smets and  Wouters (2007)                                             
U S: 1966QI-2004QIV
0.0223% 0.2051%
Smets and  Wouters (2005)*                                               
U S: 1974QI-2002QII
0.0567% 0.4895%
Smets and  Wouters (2005)*                                                      
Eu ro Area: 1974QI-2002QII
0.0523% 0.4449%
J ustiniano, Primicer i and Tamb alott i (2008)**                                                
U S: 1954QIII-2004QIV
0.0380% 0.3475%
*W age markups are estimated  as rand om noises instead of AR(1) s.
** O nly n eutral  tech nolo gy  sho ck considered.
Table 1: Welfare losses under misperception of heterogeneity in price stickiness (%
difference from 1st best in steady state consumption level)
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 Reference for Parameter Estimation Low Variance 
Heterogeneous 
Economy
High Variance 
Heterogeneous 
Economy
Smets and Wouters (2007)                                             
US: 1966QI-2004QIV
0.0014% 0.0023%
Smets and Wouters (2005)*                                               
US: 1974QI-2002QII
0.0007% 0.0034%
Smets and Wouters (2005)*                                                      
Euro Area: 1974QI-2002QII
0.0007% 0.0031%
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2008)**                                                
US: 1954QIII-2004QIV
0.0027% 0.0043%
*Wage markups are estimated as random noises instead of AR(1)s.
** Only neutral technology shock considered.
Table 2: Welfare losses under homogeneous taxation (% difference from 1st best in
steady state consumption level).
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